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LIFE AFTER DEBT: THE NEW ECONOMIC TRAJECTORY 
IN LATIN AMERICA 
The last ten years in Latin America have been dominated by the debt crisis, 
which has forced the region - traditionally a net recipient of foreign resources 
- to transfer to the rest of the world some $220 billion.1 Despite the widely-
held view that the twenty republics in the region could only be saved by 
wholesale debt forgiveness, the economic and social upheavals associated with 
this change have been absorbed with remarkable success by political systems 
which are now guided in virtually all cases by civilian governments subject to 
periodic elections. The myth that only authoritarian regimes can carry out tough 
economic and social policies has now been well and truly laid to rest. 
The debt crisis of the last ten years has been portrayed as an exceptional 
event requiring an exceptional international response. Yet it is in fact only the 
last in a long series which have plagued Latin America since independence. 
Indeed, major debt crises have recurred at approximately 50-year intervals -
1820s, 1870s, 1930s and 1980s - which has led some scholars to argue that 
debt is one of the phenomena subject to the 50-year long waves first studied by 
Kondratief.2 Like most Kondratief waves, this one is hard to justify on 
theoretical grounds, but if any of my grandchildren go into banking I shall 
certainly take out insurance by recommending some serious reading of 
economic history as the year 2030 approaches. 
The exit from each debt crisis in Latin America has been marked by the 
transition to a new economic trajectory. The first, in the 1820s, was associated 
with the wholesale adoption of export-led growth based on primary products 
destined for the new markets of the North Atlantic. The second, in the 1870s, 
was linked to the rise of modern manufacturing as the larger republics 
attempted to link export-led growth based on primary products with 
industrialisation geared to the home market. The third, in the 1930s, was 
marked by the adoption of aggressive import substitution policies as republics 
began to delink from the world economy. Today, in the 1990s, a new trajectory 
is taking shape which has been moulded by the response to the debt crisis of 
the last decade and which marks a significant break with the past. 
If the debt crisis is passing, that does not mean that debt has ceased to be a 
problem. Some republics, notably Argentina and Brazil, are currently involved 
in major negotiations with their creditors to reduce the debt burden. Even those 
republics, such as Chile, which have reduced the nominal value of the external 
public debt, must still exercise prudence in debt management techniques. Yet 
the situation today is qualitatively different from five years ago when the 
private creditors had still not formally acknowledged the difference between the 
market and par value of the debt. Today it is clear that - as in all previous debt 
crises - the private, and in some cases even the public, creditors have accepted 
that the debt will not be repaid in full. Although many republics still have to 
establish the precise terms for repayment, sufficient precedents have been set 
to avoid the need for a punitive final agreement. The debt crisis of the 1980s 
has given way to the debt problem of the 1990s. 
The threat of default by the Mexican government in August 1982 on its 
external public debt was the trigger which finally unleashed the most recent 
debt crisis. The flow of new bank lending to Latin America ground to a halt 
and the net transfer of resources suddenly turned negative.3 Even countries, 
such as Colombia, which had been prudent in accumulating foreign debt 
obligations were affected as private financial institutions in the developed 
countries reversed their previously optimistic forecasts about the region. 
This decline in bank lending has set in motion a chain of events which is 
leading to a new growth model based on exports. The transition to a new 
trajectory is not painless and is still incomplete even in those countries prepared 
to carry out the most far-reaching programme of reforms. Yet countries face 
few alternatives, for the logic of the situation has demanded a response from 
governments right across the political spectrum. The old growth model, based 
on a central role for the state in the process of capital accumulation, has been 
attacked on one side by the decline in capital flows to state-owned enterprises 
and on the other by the emerging consensus in favour of neoliberal economics 
and a smaller state. 
The new export-led growth model is emerging in part as a pragmatic 
response to the series of adjustment and stabilisation programmes adopted in 
each republic in the 1980s. Forced by the negative transfer of resources to 
accumulate trade surpluses, Latin American republics are finally giving higher 
priority to the question of export promotion which has been on the agenda in 
many republics since the 1960s. Unable to finance deficits with funds borrowed 
from abroad, governments have also begun to address the problems of fiscal 
reform, inefficient state-owned enterprises and indiscriminate subsidies. 
The new growth model, however, is also a reflection of the unprecedented 
agreement found among International Financial Institutions, academics and 
governments in the developed countries in favour of free markets, trade and 
financial liberalisation and privatisation of public enterprises. This orthodoxy, 
despite its sometimes fragile theoretical and empirical underpinnings,4 has 
overwhelmed the remaining Latin American voices in favour of inward-looking 
policies and an interventionist state. Governments ostensibly committed to 
shrinking the boundaries of the state have come to power throughout the region 
while the intellectual climate in Latin America has turned sharply in favour of 
free market economics. Research institutes and universities committed to the 
new orthodoxy are flourishing, while traditional centres favouring even a 
reformed version of the old model are steadily eclipsed. It is only in the area 
of hyperinflation, a phenomenon far removed from the experience of the 
developed countries, and in stabilisation programmes to fight it that an original 
Latin American voice can still be heard.5 
Nowhere has the change in attitude been more apparent than in relations with 
the United States. Although the US invasion of Panama in December 1989 was 
widely condemned, the points of friction between Latin America and the United 
States have been steadily eroded. As the Cold War ended and the socialist 
experiment in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union collapsed, Cuba became 
more isolated and traditional US security concerns less pronounced. Drugs 
replaced communism in the foreign policy priorities of the US adminstration 
and drug control programmes necessitate a high degree of cooperation between 
the United States and many Latin American republics. US multinationals, once 
widely condemned for their monopolistic practices, are now courted for their 
investment and technological potential. The election of governments with a 
strong ideological preference for the private sector in many parts of Latin 
America has delighted Washington and the defeat of left-wing parties in free 
elections has eased the traditional dilemma faced by the United States in 
choosing between security and democracy.6 
Trade liberalisation has also brought North and South America closer 
together. Driven by the imperative of seeking markets for their new non-
traditional exports, many Latin American republics fear the arbitrary nature of 
a world trading system in which protectionist voices remain powerful. As 
difficulties surfaced in the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations, Mexico 
responded by asking for a Free Trade Agreement with her northern neighbour 
to secure guaranteed access for her exports and closer integration into the US 
economic system. President Bush, more sensitive than his predecessor Ronald 
Reagan to Latin American priorities, has responded positively and both 
countries have emphasised the possibility of drawing other Latin American 
republics into the network of Free Trade Agreements. 
By the beginning of the 1990s the pessimism previously expressed 
throughout the world at Latin America's economic prospects had been replaced 
by optimism. Some international bankers and government officials in developed 
countries are lavishing praise on a region which only a few years before they 
had denounced for its incompetence and corruption. Last year, for the first time 
since 1981, the net transfer of resources to the region was positive.7 This 
change was achieved not so much through a reduction in debt service payments 
as through an increase in new capital inflows. Thus, despite all the publicity, 
Latin America's exit from the debt crisis appears to owe less to the enormous 
effort invested in debt reduction schemes (such as the Brady Plan8) and more 
to the willingness of foreign capital once again to chance its arm in a region 
whose record of prompt servicing of its debts has been less than exemplary. 
The turnaround has been remarkable. As recently as 1988, net capital inflows 
to Latin America were a mere $5 billion - easily dwarfed by net payments of 
profits and interest of $34 billion. By 1990, the net inflow of capital had 
jumped to $18 billion while in 1991 it reached an estimated $36 billion. Some 
republics (notably Mexico) have been much more favoured than others, but few 
have missed out altogether.9 
The new capital arriving in Latin America is qualitatively different from the 
past. Unlike the commercial bank loans which sustained growth in the region 
in the 1970s, the new capital consists of bonds issued by blue-chip companies, 
investment by multinational companies, portfolio capital destined for emerging 
stock markets and - most important of all - the repatriation of flight capital. 
Driving all these flows is the gap in real interest rates and real rates of return 
on capital between Latin America and the developed countries - a gap which 
is no longer wiped out by the risk premium associated with the region. 
To understand these changes we need to go back a decade.The arrival of the 
debt crisis in 1982 marked the end of the massive inflow of capital - primarily 
from international banks - to Latin America. Within a short space of time a 
trade deficit funded by borrowing from abroad had to be converted into a trade 
surplus to permit repayment of interest on past loans. 
In the short-run, such a transformation - equivalent to five per cent of the 
region's Gross Domestic Product - could only be achieved by cutting imports. 
In the first three years after 1981, the value of imports was cut by 40 per cent 
bringing with it a sharp fall in income per head and in living standards.10 
Import suppression was effective, but it was a short-term strategy with high 
costs. As inflation began to accelerate and real incomes continued to fall, it 
became clear that import suppression could not be used as a long-term response 
to a debt crisis which showed no signs of abating. By the middle of the 1980s, 
an important policy change was taking place in a number of republics in favour 
of trade liberalisation and export promotion in order to meet the demands both 
of debt servicing and renewed growth. As the decade came to a close, more and 
more republics had opted for the new outward-looking strategy. By the 
beginning of the 1990s a new trade orthodoxy had swept across Latin America. 
Several factors contributed to the emergence of this new orthodoxy. It was 
argued that the debt crisis was more than a short-run liquidity problem, that the 
commercial banks were not going to continue to lend to Latin America at the 
same rate as before and that the region was going to have to compete in the 
international market place for scarce funds with other countries. Even those 
Latin American countries which were successful in attracting foreign 
investment (direct and portfolio) could not at first expect to avoid a negative 
transfer of resources and this was more likely to be combined with the renewal 
of growth in a strategy which emphasised export promotion rather than import 
suppression. 
The emphasis on the need for export promotion was shared by the official 
creditors, including the International Financial Agencies. The World Bank and 
the IMF in particular, together with the Inter-American Development Bank, 
used the leverage provided by conditionality to push the debtor countries in the 
direction of trade liberalisation. An over-simplistic contrast was drawn between 
export-led growth in East Asia and inward-looking development in Latin 
America from which the international agencies extracted the conclusion that the 
Asian model needed to be transplanted wholesale to American soil - an heroic, 
if unsuccessful, attempt to prove that Columbus was in fact correct when 500 
years ago he confused the West for the East Indies. This pressure was not 
sufficient on its own to persuade countries to move towards export-led growth, 
but it did contribute to the momentum in favour of trade liberalisation in those 
countries where an internal consensus in support of policy reform was 
emerging. 
Microeconomic considerations were also important in explaining the policy 
shift. Few, if any, policymakers favoured export-led growth on the basis of 
traditional exports. Priority was to be given to new non-traditional exports, 
including manufactured goods, where Latin America was at a disadvantage 
because of the high cost of many commodity inputs caused by import 
suppression and other trade distortions. Trade liberalisation was expected to 
bring the cost of material inputs closer into line with international costs, 
allowing local firms to exploit the long-run dynamic comparative advantage 
provided by the abundance of unskilled labour and natural resources. 
The first group of countries to embark on a wholesale strategy of trade 
liberalisation included Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador and Mexico. As early as 1984, the neoliberal governments in Chile and 
Ecuador had begun the process of tariff reductions, quota eliminations and 
export duty cuts. In mid-1985, as part of its anti-inflation stabilisation 
programme, Bolivia began its move to a single uniform tariff of ten per cent 
with zero dispersion. In the same year, Mexico accelerated the long process of 
dismantling its elaborate quota system and lowering tariffs.11 
The new trade policies were subsequently adopted in almost all the Latin 
American republics. Both Brazil and Colombia, which had been combining 
export promotion with import substitution since the late 1960s, moved towards 
more orthodox policies of trade liberalisation at the end of the 1980s. 
Argentina, despite continuing problems of inflation stabilisation, followed suit 
at the beginning of the 1990s. In a reversal of his policies in the 1970s, 
President Carlos Andres Perez began to open up the Venezuelan economy after 
1989. Only Cuba, abandoned by its former Eastern European allies, refused to 
bring domestic and international prices closer together despite its efforts to 
promote non-traditional exports.12 
The new trade policies had implications which went far beyond the 
boundaries of each republic. The promotion of non-traditional exports rendered 
countries vulnerable to discrimination through countervailing duties, non-tariff 
barriers and 'voluntary' export restraints. Safeguards were therefore sought. 
Those republics which had not yet joined GATT applied to do so and the 
licensing systems for imports in Mexico and Venezuela were almost entirely 
abolished to facilitate membership. In response to the Free Trade Agreement 
between Canada and the USA agreed at the end of the 1980s, Mexico pressed 
for a North American Free Trade Agreement. In 1989 Haiti and the Dominican 
Republic joined the Lome Convention - the only Latin American republics to 
be allowed to do so - in an effort to promote export-led growth. 
These initiatives were also extended to intra-regional trade. A bilateral 
agreement in favour of closer economic integration between Brazil and 
Argentina evolved in 1991 into MERCOSUR - a four-nation integration 
scheme committed to free trade and a common external tariff by 1995. New life 
was breathed into the Andean Pact and the Central American Common Market. 
The proposed North American Free Trade Agreement was seen as a model by 
other Latin American republics, notably Chile, and bilateral agreements in 
favour of free or freer trade were reached throughout the region. Unlike the 
earlier attempts at integration, the new schemes were seen as complementary 
to the emphasis on extra-regional export promotion. 
By 1992, a decade after the debt crisis first struck, the new policies were 
bearing fruit. The volume of exports had risen steadily and by 1991 was 78 per 
cent higher than in 1980. The performances of Chile, Colombia and Mexico 
were particularly impressive. The increase in the volume of exports was 
sufficiently strong to raise the value of exports sharply after 1987 - despite the 
continuing weakness of some commodity prices. The regional ratio of exports 
to GDP at constant prices - a useful indicator of trade policy - rose from 
eleven per cent in 1980 to seventeen per cent in 1990 with the ratio almost 
doubling in Argentina and Brazil.13 Trade liberalisation made possible fast 
growth of imports, but export expansion prevented a major erosion of the 
regional trade surplus which still exceeded $10 billion in 1991.14 
The new trade policies won applause from export interests and creditor 
countries, grudging approval from most business groups and acceptance by 
many intellectuals. Protests by groups whose interests were damaged were 
surprisingly limited. Yet many problems remained. By the beginning of the 
1990s Latin America's share of world exports was still less than four per cent 
- less than half its share of world population.15 Several smaller countries, as 
a result of their vulnerability to commodity price falls, had still not recovered 
the 1980 level of exports. The geographical concentration of exports increased 
further with the US share rising sharply in most republics at the expense of the 
European Community.16 While intra-regional trade began to increase, its share 
of total exports remained modest. 
The composition of exports was also a source of concern. Much of the 
increase in the value of exports came from traditional exports (for example, 
Chilean copper) or non-traditional natural resources (for example, Colombian 
coal). The region's exports remained heavily dependent on primary products 
which made earnings - despite the reforms expected under the GATT Uruguay 
Round - very vulnerable to external shocks. In the crucial area of manufactured 
exports, only a few countries made real progress. The sharp increase in the 
importance of metal manufactures in exports was almost entirely due to Brazil 
and Mexico. Many goods classified as manufactured were little more than 
'screw-driver' industries consisting of products assembled in Export Processing 
Zones. While much had undoubtedly been achieved in terms of external 
adjustment in the decade after the debt crisis, much remained to be done with 
export performance still lagging behind the record of some Asian countries. 
The debt crisis, by reducing the flow of new capital to Latin America, 
obliged each republic to cut imports and, if possible, increase exports quickly. 
However, this external adjustment was mirrored by a process of internal 
adjustment which was designed to lower aggregate demand to a level consistent 
with the reduced level of imports and provide the price and other incentives for 
a shift of supply from the home to the world market. 
The trade surplus provided the foreign exchange for the net transfer of 
resources to the creditors in the developed countries. The trade surplus in most 
countries, however, accrued to the private sector while the vast majority of the 
external debt was in the hands of the public sector. Thus, there was an internal 
transfer problem in which the public sector had to secure access to the foreign 
exchange earned by the private sector. Only in those republics, such as Chile, 
Mexico and Venezuela, with a high share of export earnings accruing to state-
owned enterprises was the internal transfer of resources relatively 
straightforward.17 
Internal adjustment was therefore a complicated process involving a 
reduction in home demand, a shift in supply and an internal transfer from the 
private to the public sector. Each element of adjustment ran the risk of 
aggravating inflationary pressures. If home demand fell too slowly, excess 
demand would emerge even in a recession as the cut in imports after 1981 had 
reduced aggregate supply quickly. The shift in supply from the home to the 
world market implied a change in relative prices which was likely to cause an 
increase in absolute prices. Finally, the internal transfer of foreign exchange to 
the public sector would be highly inflationary if the government printed money 
to secure control of the resources rather than using tax revenue to generate a 
sufficient level of public savings. 
The problem of internal adjustment was therefore inseparable from both 
external adjustment and inflation stabilisation. At the same time, most Latin 
American republics entered the debt crisis with serious problems of internal 
instability - including high levels of inflation. In 1981, the last year before the 
eruption of the debt crisis, only five republics enjoyed annual inflation rates of 
less than ten per cent and in each case the exchange rate was pegged in nominal 
terms to the US dollar.18 Elsewhere, eleven had annual inflation rates above 
20 per cent, four above 50 per cent and one (Argentina) above 100 per cent. 
Central government budget deficits had also begun to increase before the debt 
crisis and almost half the countries in 1981 had a deficit in excess of five per 
cent of GDP.19 Public sector deficits, which included the losses of state-owned 
enterprises together with the deficits of municipal and state administrations, 
were usually even larger than those of the central government. With domestic 
capital markets in many republics unwilling or unable to absorb large issues of 
government paper, the inflationary consequences of even modest budget deficits 
could be considerable. 
The situation inherited at the time of the debt crisis was therefore far from 
satisfactory. Furthermore, many of the measures adopted in response to the debt 
crisis in support of external adjustment aggravated the problem of internal 
instability even further. The sharp real effective exchange rate devaluations, 
although they contributed significantly to the creation of a trade surplus, added 
to inflationary pressures. Almost all republics abandoned fixed nominal 
exchange rates and the two exceptions (Haiti and Panama) were the only 
countries to keep the rate of inflation regularly below 10 per cent. In the 
smaller republics, as inflation accelerated, the change in the black market or 
parallel exchange rate became the signal for price increases throughout the 
economy, making it necessary for the authorities to carry out larger and larger 
nominal devaluations to achieve a given real depreciation. 
External adjustment led to a sharp cut in imports and domestic recession with 
severe implications for government revenue. Smaller republics, still dependent 
on import duties for a high share of government revenue, suffered particularly 
from the decline in imports. Although tariff rates were at first increased in 
several republics, this could not offset the impact of the sharp decline in the 
value and volume of imports. The recession drove many firms and workers 
from the formal to the informal sector, making it more difficult for the state to 
extract taxation from the production and distribution of goods and services. At 
the same time, incentives to encourage a shift of supply from the home to the 
world market often implied a tax reduction for exporters. Not surprisingly, 
central government revenue as a proportion of GDP fell in most republics in the 
first years of the crisis.20 
Although cuts were made in public expenditure as a result of numerous 
stabilisation programmes, the difficulty of increasing revenue after the debt 
crisis meant that few, if any republics, were able to generate a primary surplus 
large enough to finance out of income the purchase of foreign exchange from 
the private sector for debt servicing. Furthermore, many countries operated a 
multiple exchange rate system in which the public sector was able to buy 
foreign exchange at a special rate which implied huge exchange rate losses for 
the central bank. These losses typically did not enter into the definition of the 
budget deficit so that the latter often gave a misleading impression of fiscal and 
monetary orthodoxy.21 
Many countries simply printed money in order to purchase the foreign 
exchange needed for debt servicing. However, the largest republics (Argentina 
and Brazil in particular) were able to issue bonds or other financial instruments 
to the private sector as a means of carrying out the internal transfer. Although 
in theory this was non-inflationary, in practice it had serious inflationary 
consequences. First, the nominal and real domestic rate of interest had to rise 
sharply to persuade the private domestic sector to absorb government debt and 
this was reflected in a sharp rise in the unit costs of many firms; secondly, the 
debt itself was highly liquid (particularly in Brazil) so that it was virtually 
quasi-money; thirdly, the internal debt rose so rapidly that nominal interest 
payments began to absorb a growing proportion of government revenue, thus 
undermining the public sector financial balance. Both Argentina and Brazil 
eventually declared a partial default on their internal debt, destroying 
temporarily private sector confidence in the domestic capital market and raising 
the cost of future borrowing for the government.22 
With the emergence of a secondary market in Latin American debt after 
1982, the public and private sectors looked for ways of taking advantage of the 
steep discounts often available. Legislation was introduced in a number of 
countries permitting both debt-conversion and debt-equity swaps - the former 
leading to the replacement of external with internal debt and the latter leading 
to the replacement of external debt with equity.23 Although both techniques 
could lower the face value of the public external debt (substantially in the 
Chilean case), they were not without inflationary risks. Both Brazil and Mexico 
suspended their debt-equity schemes temporarily when it became clear that the 
issue of domestic currency for the face value of the discounted debt was having 
serious repercussions on the growth of the money supply. These fears were 
aggravated in the case of foreign holders of discounted debt by the widespread 
belief that debt-equity swaps were subsidising foreign investment without 
adding much to the total flow. Indeed, direct foreign investment in Latin 
America remained stubbornly low in most countries throughout the 1980s 
despite the subsidy implied by secondary market conversions.24 
By the middle of the 1980s inflation was substantially higher than it had been 
before the debt crisis in almost all republics. As inflation accelerated, it became 
clear that the budget deficit and the rate of inflation were interdependent. 
Although the orthodox claim that budget deficits would lead to inflation could 
not be denied, it was also true that the acceleration of inflation caused a 
widening of the budget deficit - at least when expressed in nominal terms. 
In a few republics, the failure to adopt appropriate stabilisation and 
adjustment programmes in response to the debt crisis led to hyperinflation -
usually defined as a monthly rate of inflation in excess of 50 per cent. By the 
end of 1984, Bolivia was covering only two per cent of government expenditure 
with tax revenue and the rate of inflation in 1985 exceeded 8,000 per cent.25 
Even this extraordinary figure was surpassed by Nicaragua in 1988 when 
defence expenditure was given overriding priority and the process of printing 
money pushed inflation over 33,000 per cent (the highest ever recorded in Latin 
America). The last years of the Garcia administration in Peru were marred by 
a similar story with a flight from domestic currency and huge fiscal deficits 
pushing inflation above 7,000 per cent in 1990. Both Argentina26 and Brazil 
- the true size of their fiscal deficits concealed by creative accounting at all 
levels of government - slid into hyperinflation at various points with 
administrations in both republics in the 1980s unwilling to make the fight 
against inflation their highest priority. 
Internal adjustment required the adoption of stabilisation programmes 
throughout Latin America. Since the rescheduling of debt was generally only 
possible if a country had signed an agreement with the IMF, the Fund found 
itself playing a key role in the design and implementation of the first wave of 
stabilisation programmes in the 1980s. Only five countries were able to avoid 
submitting to Fund conditionality during this first wave - Cuba (not a member 
of the Fund), Nicaragua (denied IMF support through US pressure), Colombia 
(which never rescheduled), and Paraguay and Venezuela (where IMF balance 
of payments support was not needed). 
The close involvement of the Fund in the design of stabilisation programmes 
meant that policy was at first orthodox. Although the IMF remained committed 
to currency devaluation, financial liberalisation and domestic credit control, the 
Fund-inspired programmes emphasised in particular the need to reduce the 
fiscal deficit through increases in revenue and cuts in expenditure. The call for 
fiscal discipline was reinforced in several republics by agreements with the 
World Bank on structural adjustment and with USAID on reductions in public 
sector activity. 
The need to reduce public expenditure was frustrated by the rising proportion 
of public revenue absorbed by interest payments on the debt (internal and 
external) and the reluctance of governments to reduce the public sector wage 
bill too drastically. Thus, the burden of adjustment fell disproportionately on 
capital rather than current expenditure with the share of investment in total 
public expenditure falling in the 1980s in almost all republics. Public works, 
health and education all suffered grievously from the reductions; the only 
country to resist the trend was the Dominican Republic, where public 
investment increased sharply after 1985 as the newly-elected Balaguer 
administration postponed internal adjustment in favour of the political 
advantages to be extracted from public works and increased public sector 
employment.27 
Public expenditure cuts were not sufficient to restore fiscal discipline. Indeed, 
the growth of interest payments on the debt (internal and external) meant that 
total public expenditure continued to rise in many countries as a proportion of 
GDP despite the curbs on government spending. In Brazil, for example, total 
central government expenditure jumped from 27 per cent of GDP in 1981 to 38 
per cent in 1985. Even Mexico, where fiscal austerity was applied with greater 
conviction, saw an increase from 21 per cent in 1981 to 31 per cent in 1987. In 
both cases, the explanation was provided by the disproportionately rapid rise 
in interest payments, which were taking over 50 per cent of total Mexican 
central government expenditure by 1987 compared with less than ten per cent 
in 1980.28 
Orthodox stabilisation programmes therefore had to address the revenue side 
of the equation. Yet the circumstances could hardly have been less favourable. 
Recession after 1981 and the flight into the informal sector made tax collection 
harder and external adjustment required numerous tax concessions to stimulate 
exports. Thus, a policy of increasing tax rates (direct and indirect) was unlikely 
to meet with much success and the first wave of stabilisation programmes -
with substantial prodding from the IMF - tended to emphasise the need to raise 
tariffs on all services provided by the public sector in order to reduce losses by 
state-owned enterprises. 
As the present or expected profitability of public enterprises increased 
following these price rises, the possibility of selling public sector assets to the 
private sector (privatisation) became more realistic. Yet, despite IMF pressure, 
only Chile - continuing the policies adopted after 1973 - made much use of 
privatisation as a solution to the fiscal problem in the first half of the 1980s. 
Governments in other republics at first remained unconvinced, either because 
they feared that public sector assets could only be sold to the private sector at 
prices which did not reflect their present discounted value or because they 
feared the damage to long-run growth from public sector disinvestment. As the 
fiscal crisis continued, however, and as it became clear that foreign lending to 
state-owned enterprises would remain restricted, other governments joined the 
bandwagon in favour of privatisation so that by the beginning of the 1990s the 
sale of public sector assets was contributing to fiscal revenue in almost all 
republics.29 
The problems of raising government revenue after 1982 emphasised the 
extremely fragile tax base in many Latin American republics and forced the 
issue of tax reform onto the agenda. Although marginal tax rates were often 
quite high, exemptions, evasion and avoidance reduced tax collection 
substantially. Even before the debt crisis, 12 republics generated less than 15 
per cent of GDP in central government revenue and only five more than 20 per 
cent. Even state-ownership of mineral exports did not guarantee high tax 
receipts. Tax reform therefore could no longer be avoided and the highest 
priority was widening of the tax base. A favourite candidate was introduction 
or extension of a Value-Added Tax, providing broad coverage of all goods and 
services. Direct tax rates on business and individuals were changed, leading to 
lower rates and tightening up on exemptions and evasion. Chile and Mexico led 
the way, but other countries followed. 
The first wave of stabilisation programmes after the debt crisis was not very 
successful. Despite the high profile adopted by the IMF and the widespread use 
of Fund conditionality, inflation accelerated in most republics after 1981. 
Failure to meet agreed targets led the Fund to suspend many of its standby 
agreements and Extended Fund Facilities. Brazil signed seven letters of intent 
with the IMF in the space of a few years and targets were often broken before 
the first funds were released.30 
The Fund blamed governments for lack of fiscal and monetary discipline, but 
it was clear that the problem was far more deep-rooted. Of the 15 countries 
suffering from internal disequilibrium and inflation before the debt crisis, only 
one (Costa Rica) had made real progress on stabilisation by the mid-1980s. The 
shock to internal stability delivered by the debt crisis was in general too severe 
to be handled within the framework of an orthodox IMF-inspired stabilisation 
programme because the inherited problem of instability was already so severe. 
Even some of those countries which had avoided severe internal disequilibrium 
before 1982 (for example, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala and Honduras) 
were unsuccessful in carrying out the necessary internal adjustments after the 
debt crisis. 
As the limitations of an orthodox response became clear, interest in 
heterodox stabilisation programmes increased. A new theory of inflation began 
to gain acceptance which emphasised its inertial character and addressed the 
question of a coordinated reduction in prices in order to lower inflationary 
expectations.31 The orthodox approach was criticised for its reliance on market 
forces to break expectations in a context where inflationary expectations were 
sustained by exchange rate devaluation, nominal interest rate increases and the 
rise in public sector tariffs. Without any nominal anchors, the rate of inflation 
in the orthodox approach could easily drift upwards despite the recession and 
tight fiscal and monetary policies. 
Heterodox stabilisation programmes were adopted in a number of Latin 
American republics in the second half of the 1980s. A central element in the 
programmes was a sharp change in relative prices at the beginning to remove 
distortions followed by a freeze on certain prices (including nominal wage 
rates) to break inflationary expectations. The widespread use of indexation in 
high inflation countries was ended with only a few exceptions. As inflation 
came down, it was assumed that the so-called Oliveira-Tanzi effect would begin 
to operate in reverse32 - increasing real tax revenue and encouraging an 
increase in real money balances (and private sector savings). Architects of the 
programmes recognised that the price freeze could not be expected to last 
forever; a frozen exchange rate would lead to currency overvaluation, fixed 
nominal wages to a fall in real wages and price control to the emergence of 
new distortions, but it was assumed that by the time the freeze was lifted 
inflationary expectations would have been permanently lowered. 
Heterodox stabilisation programmes were not without their successes. The 
hyperinflation in Bolivia ended abruptly in 1985 following the adoption of a 
programme which froze money wages, reformed the fiscal system completely 
and liberalised the market for foreign exchange. The Mexican programme, 
launched in December 1987 with a tripartite agreement between business, 
unions and government, also brought inflation down rapidly with the controlled 
exchange rate playing a crucial role in breaking inflationary expectations; as 
inflation came down, nominal interest rates also fell and the fiscal burden 
implied by high levels of debt servicing became more tolerable.33 The 
Nicaraguan hyperinflation was stopped dead in its tracks in 1991 as a result of 
a fixed exchange rate, tight monetary policy and access to foreign finance to 
support additional imports. 
The heterodox programmes in Bolivia, Mexico and Nicaragua did not ignore 
the need for fiscal discipline. Thus, heterodox measures were combined with 
orthodox policies in a successful mix. By contrast, the heterodox programmes 
launched in Argentina in 1985 (the Austral Plan) and Brazil in 1986 (the 
Cruzado Plan) were notable for the absence of a tight fiscal policy. The rate of 
inflation at first fell sharply, in response to the freeze on prices and the fixing 
of the exchange rate, but nominal aggregate demand continued to outstrip 
available supply and inflationary pressures soon reemerged. As the distortions 
in relative prices reappeared, price controls had to be lifted before fiscal 
discipline had been restored. The result was an explosion in the rate of inflation 
which soon surpassed the rate before the adoption of the heterodox 
programmes.34 
The failure of these heterodox programmes in Argentina and Brazil did not 
at first lead to a restoration of orthodoxy. On the contrary, governments in both 
countries were even willing to freeze domestic financial assets in a desperate 
attempt to bring both inflation and the budget deficit under control. Yet by the 
beginning of the 1990s, after a decade of failed stabilisation programmes, the 
need to combine orthodox fiscal measures (including privatisation) with 
heterodox policies was finally recognised. Argentina was the great success 
story, reducing monthly inflation by the end of 1991 to negligible levels. By 
this time, a consensus on stabilisation had begun to emerge throughout Latin 
America which stressed tax reform, privatisation and 'realistic' prices for public 
sector services as a necessary condition for price stability. Indeed, at the end 
of 1991 only Brazil was still suffering from monthly rates of inflation in 
excess of five per cent and eleven republics had monthly rates below two per 
cent. The dragon of inflation is slowly being tamed. 
The promotion of exports and the taming of inflation are the two most 
important milestones in Latin America's journey from the old to the new 
trajectory. Yet none of it could have happened without a radical overhaul of 
economic policy. As it became clear that the net supply of loans from the 
international banks to the public sector was drying up, governments throughout 
the region were forced to recognise that the model of development based on 
large-scale public investments by state-owned enterprises had collapsed. The 
preference for private over public investment became a matter of necessity as 
the state found itself obliged to cut back on investment programmes throughout 
the economy. Cuba - unmoved by the collapse of communism in Eastern 
Europe - defied the trend, although foreign investment through joint ventures 
was tolerated. Only in those countries where the public sector controlled a high 
proportion of export earnings through state-owned enterprises was it possible 
to anticipate a major renewal of public investment, with Venezuela's state-
owned oil industry leading the way. 
By the beginning of the 1990s it had become fashionable to compare reform 
in Latin America favourably with the policy agenda favoured by international 
creditors (the so-called Washington Consensus).35 A composite distilled 
essentially from the experience of a number of East Asian countries, the 
Washington Consensus emphasised reform of balance of payments policy, 
fiscal policy, competition policy and financial liberalisation. Although neither 
Washington itself nor any East Asian country had ever implemented the whole 
agenda, the Washington Consensus acquired an almost mythical status as the 
alleged basis for successful adjustment and prerequisite for long-run sustainable 
growth. 
There is a family resemblance between the Washington Consensus and policy 
reform in Latin America, but the differences are at least as important as the 
similarities. The vast majority of Latin American republics at first adopted 
policy reform in the 1980s as a short-run response to the new circumstances 
created by the debt crisis. Thus, policy reform in Latin America emphasised 
those elements in the Washington Consensus which coincided with the new 
reality (for example, competitive real exchange rates) while paying much less 
attention to other policies (for example, deregulation) where reform could be 
postponed. 
The difference between the two approaches to policy reform was brought out 
clearly by the practice of privatisation. While Chile and later Mexico 
recognised the desirability of privatisation on efficiency grounds, other 
governments promoted it primarily for fiscal reasons. Public sector enterprises 
were sold to the private sector at prices below the present discounted value in 
order to secure an immediate contribution to government revenues; public 
sector monopolies were converted into private sector monopolies with little or 
no attempt to increase competition. Highly profitable state-owned enterprises, 
which contributed handsomely to government income, were retained within the 
public sector although efficiency would almost certainly have improved if 
privatisation had been adopted.36 
Policy reform was needed to shift Latin America onto a new trajectory where 
fast growth of exports and low rates of inflation would continue to prevail. By 
the beginning of 1992, Latin America had achieved considerable success in 
both these areas. Yet policies to promote export-led growth were also fraught 
with difficulties. While most countries were able to increase the volume of 
exports, the international trading system continued to treat primary products 
less favourably than manufactured goods or services. The collapse of the 
international tin agreement in 1986 was a cruel reminder to Bolivia, for 
example, of the perils of high levels of commodity concentration in exports37 
and the persistent decline in the US sugar import quota wiped out most of the 
gains from increases in non-traditional exports in a number of Caribbean Basin 
countries.38 
The Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations placed trade in agricultural 
products firmly on the agenda. A possible agreement on trade liberalisation, 
after many disappointments and apparent failures, is raising expectations in 
some quarters that primary product exports would now be protected against 
arbitrary decisions and non-tariff barriers. The relative decline in the 
importance of agricultural trade, however, is a long-run phenomenon which 
cannot be reversed through a reduction in trade discrimination. The most 
dynamic branches of international trade remain manufactured goods and 
services, where Latin America entered the 1980s at a distinct disadvantage. A 
decade later, only Mexico and Brazil could claim to have shifted the structure 
of exports significantly in favour of products with dynamic long-run 
prospects.39 Even Chile, despite its above average performance, was still 
overwhelmingly dependent on a traditional export (copper) and a handful of 
non-traditional primary products (fruits, fishing and forestry). 
It is therefore by no means certain that the transition to a new trajectory will 
bring rapid growth to all Latin America. Indeed, as each new trajectory has 
unfolded in Latin America, the failures have tended to outnumber the successes. 
If it is probable that there will be some success stories in the new trajectory, it 
does not follow that trade liberalisation, inflation stabilisation and policy reform 
can guarantee success. Furthermore, the region is still plagued by a highly 
unequal distribution of income and wealth on which the impact of the new 
growth model remains very uncertain. There is also the vexed question of the 
impact of renewed growth on the environment - a subject which is certain to 
become more important in the 1990s. 
A decade after the debt crisis, economic recovery is still modest in Latin 
America. Growth in some of the smaller countries has been undermined by 
unfavourable movements in the net barter terms of trade. Investment and 
domestic savings are in many cases below the rates .equired to sustain long-run 
growth. The fiscal problems in some countries continue to rule out the public 
investments needed to 'crowd-in' private investment and reverse capital flight. 
And yet almost all economies have become more outward-looking, with the 
ratio of exports to GDP rising, while the level of imports has climbed steeply 
since the mid-1980s. Trade liberalisation has not brought the feared explosion 
in consumer goods and many firms are responding positively to the need to 
compete - often for the first time - with goods from abroad. Financial crisis at 
the beginning of the 1980s had driven down the value of nearly all assets, 
creating exceptional opportunities for those entrepreneurs willing to risk their 
capital in an uncertain environment. New conglomerates have been formed 
(often from traditional family groups) to secure industrial and financial 
leadership within each country. This younger generation of economic elites, 
many of whom have been trained and educated abroad, is more receptive to 
new business ideas and less committed to preserving a protected domestic 
market than its predecessor. 
By the beginning of the 1990s, two countries - Chile and Mexico - had laid 
the basis for sustainable long-run growth as a result of successful internal and 
external adjustment and policy reform. The repatriation of capital has begun 
and policy reform has been rewarded with renewed access to voluntary capital 
flows and the international bond market. In both countries the unequal 
distribution of income and the absence of a safety net for the poor remains a 
serious cause for concern, but the return to democracy in Chile and the shift to 
greater political accountability in Mexico gives grounds for cautious optimism 
even on matters of equity. 
A second group of countries - Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Uruguay and Venezuela - has made considerable 
progress on policy reform and adjustment. Yet none had completed the process 
of adjustment by the beginning of 1992 so that many unanswered questions 
remained. Bolivia's stabilisation programme in 1985 had won much admiration, 
but external adjustment was still incomplete six years later and the fiscal 
problem not yet fully resolved. Fiscal difficulties remained at the heart of the 
problem in Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador and Uruguay, while Ecuador and 
Venezuela struggled to break free from their dependence on oil. Argentina had 
begun the task of reversing fifty years of relative economc decline with courage 
and determination, but its previous track-record and the accumulated problems 
led even the most enthusiastic supporters to postpone final judgement. 
The remaining countries have all made some attempt at stabilisation, 
adjustment and policy reform, but the results are so far modest. Some members 
of this group - Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Haiti, Panama and 
Paraguay - had made only minimal attempts at reform by the end of the 1980s, 
valuing the political costs of adjustment far above any economic gains. Others 
- Brazil, Honduras, Nicaragua and Peru - have tackled the problems 
courageously, but the scale of the task and the delay in implementing reform 
had produced only modest results even a decade after the debt crisis first 
started. Few questioned the need for reform, but the obstacles standing in the 
path of successful adjustment blocked a swift transition to the new trajectory. 
Just as after previous debt crises, therefore, the new trajectory will not offer 
equal benefits to all republics. In the first fifty years after independence, the 
republics benefiting most from the new model were Chile and Peru. The prize 
in the second cycle after 1870 undoubtedly went to Argentina and Uruguay, 
while few would deny that Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela were the major 
beneficiaries of the Kondratief wave after 1930. If no Latin American republic 
can yet be classified as developed, it is in no small part due to the failure of any 
republic to sustain rapid growth in each of the past three cycles. Yet all Latin 
American countries (with the exception of Haiti) are now classified by the 
World Bank as middle-income and those republics which are most successful 
in the current 50-year cycle can expect to reach the standard of living now 
enjoyed by the citizens of Portugal, Greece, Ireland and Spain.40 That may not 
sound very exciting, but for the millions of Latin Americans who are still short 
of basic human needs it is a goal well worth striving for and one which sound 
economic policy can help to achieve. 
NOTES 
1. See United Nations, Preliminary Overview of the Latin American and 
Caribbean Economy 1991 (Santiago, December 1991), Table 16. 
2. These successive debt crises are studied in Carlos Marichal, A Century of 
Debt Crises in Latin America (Princeton, 1989). 
3. The transfer of resources is defined as the net inflow of capital less the net 
payments of profit and interest. 
4. For a critique of the new orthodoxy, see Tariq Banuri (ed.), Economic 
Liberalization: no Panacea (Oxford, 1991). 
5. Research institutes in Argentina and Brazil, both countries that have suffered 
from severe bouts of hyperinflation, have been at the frontier of this work. 
6. The dilemma has not, however, been entirely resolved as was made clear by 
the (mild) US response to the autogolpe declared by President Fujimori in Peru. 
7. Despite net payments of profit and interest of $29.3 billion, it is estimated 
that the net transfer of resources in 1991 was $6.7 billion. See United Nations, 
op. cit. 
8. The Brady Plan, named after the US Treasury Secretary under President 
Bush, is the name given to the scheme - endorsed by the governments of the 
main creditor countries - that allows creditors to choose from a menu of debt-
reducing options offered by the debtor country. Mexico took advantage of the 
scheme in 1989, followed by Costa Rica and Venezuela. 
9. Some estimates put the inflow of capital to Mexico in 1991 as high as $16 
billion. This is consistent with the rise in international reserves despite a huge 
increase in imports. 
10. The value (fob) of imports was $101 billion in 1981. By 1984 this had fallen 
to $61 billion. See Inter-American Development Bank, Economic and Social 
Progress in Latin America, 1991 Report (Washington, D.C., 1991), Table D-4. 
11. The Bolivian and Mexican stabilisation programmes are examined in 
Michael Bruno, Guido Di Telia, Rudiger Dornbusch and Stanley Fischer (eds.), 
Inflation Stabilization (Cambridge, Ma., 1988). 
12. These non-tradtional exports include not only goods (e.g. nickel, citrus), but 
also services (e.g. tourism). 
13. See Inter-American Development Bank, op. cit., Tables B-l and B-6. 
14. Imports jumped from $92.5 billion in 1990 to an estimated $110.3 billion in 
1991. See United Nations, op. cit., Table 14. 
15. Latin America's share of world trade is reported annually in International 
Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook (Washington, D.C.). 
16. See Instituto de Relaciones Europeo-Latinoamericanas (IRELA), Economic 
Relations Between the European Community and Latin America: a Statistical 
Profile (Madrid, 1991). 
17. In all three countries earnings from the leading export accrued to state-
owned enterprises so that the foreign exchange was 'purchased' by the state 
from itself. 
18. The five republics were the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Haiti, 
Honduras and Panama. 
19. See Inter-American Development Bank, op. cit., Table C-4. 
20. In Uruguay, for example, the ratio dropped from 17.4 per cent in 1981 to 
13.5 per cent in 1984. 
21. A typical example is provided by Costa Rica, where the 'official' exchange 
rate - used for external debt payments - was set at 20 colones per US dollar, 
while the interbank rate - used for virtually everything else - steadily 
depreciated. See Consejo Monetario Centroamericano, Boletin Estadistico (San 
Jose, 1991). 
22. See the chapters on Argentina and Brazil in Michael Bruno et al (eds.), 
Lessons of Economic Stabilization and Its Aftermath (Cambridge, Ma., 1991). 
23. The difference between debt-conversion and debt-equity swaps is explained 
in Ricardo Ffrench-Davis, 'Debt and Growth in Chile: Trends and Prospects', 
in David Felix (ed.), Debt and Transfiguration? Prospects for Latin America s 
Economic Revival (Armonk, N.Y., 1990). 
24. Direct foreign investment, which had reached $8 billion in 1981, had fallen 
to $2.8 billion by 1986. See Inter-American Development Bank, op. cit., Table 
D-14. 
25. There is a good account of the hyperinflationary episode and the subsequent 
stabilisation programme in Juan-Antonio Morales, 'Inflation Stabilization in 
Bolivia', in Bruno et al, op. cit. 
26. The worst moment in Argentina occurred in March 1990, when the monthly 
rate of change of consumer prices reached 95.5 per cent. See CEDEAL, 
Situation Latinoamericana (Madrid), Diciembre 1991, p. 21. 
27. It must also be remembered that the Dominican Republic had suffered from 
serious riots when an IMF-supported stabilisation programme was adopted in 
1984. 
28. See Inter-American Development Bank, op. cit., Table C-17. 
29. Privatisation has spawned a small cottage industry of publications in its own 
right. See, for example, Latin Finance: Privatization in Latin America (March, 
1992), where an overview is given of the privatisation process throughout the 
region. 
30. See Dionisio Dias Carneiro, 'Long-run Adjustment, the Debt Crisis and the 
Changing Role of Stabilisation Policies in the Recent Brazilian Experience', in 
Rosemary Thorp and Laurence Whitehead (eds.), Latin American Debt and the 
Adjustment Crisis (London, 1987). 
31. On inertial inflation, see Edward Amadeo et al, Inflation y Estabilization en 
America Latina (Bogota, 1990). 
32. The Oliveira-Tanzi effect describes the decline in real tax revenues as a 
result of accelerating inflation in an economy with lags between tax liability and 
tax payment. 
33. There have been a number of good accounts of the Mexican stabilisation 
programme. See, for example, Bruno et al, op. cit. 
34. On the Austral plan, see Jose Luis Machinea and Jose Maria Fanelli, 
'Stopping Hyperinflation: The Case of the Austral Plan in Argentina, 1985-87', 
in Bruno et al, op. cit; on the Cruzado plan, see Eduardo Modiano, 'The 
Cruzado First Attempt: The Brazilian Stabilization Program of February 1986', 
ibid. 
35. See John Williamson (ed.), Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has 
Happened? (Washington, D.C.), 1990. 
36. Even in Chile, the country most committed to free enterprise and the private 
sector, much of the copper industry was retained in public ownership through 
the state-owned enterprise CODELCO. 
37. Bolivia also suffered, however, from the repeated failure of Argentina to pay 
for gas exports - a reminder that Latin American countries could also be 
creditors as well as debtors within the region. 
38. When the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) was launched by President 
Reagan in 1984, sugar and other sensitive products were excluded from its 
provisions. 
39. By the end of the 1980s, more than 50 per cent of exports consisted of 
manufactured goods and many of these were in fast-growing sectors. 
40. In 1989, the average per capita income in Latin America was $1,950, with 
the highest figure being recorded by Uruguay ($2,620). In Portugal and Greece 
income per head was $4,250 and $5,350 respectively. See World Bank, World 
Development Report 1991 (Washington D.C., 1991), Table 1. 
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